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BOOK NOTICES.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. By JOHN CAIRD, D. D., Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Glasgow. Glasgow: James Maclehose, 1880.

The substance of this book, as the author tells us, was delivered as the "Croall Lecture" for 1878-79. He acknowledges obligations to many works bearing on his theme, but "Above all, to Hegel's *Philosophie der Religion*, a work to which he has been more largely indebted than to any other book." Thoughtful readers of this book will express equally warm obligations to this labor of Principal Caird, if we mistake not. It is a work which will find its place in the hands of sober-minded men and women in all English-speaking countries, for the unrest of scepticism has affected so many that there is no longer a demand for religious books of simple devotion, but there must be something to appeal to the intellect. The theoretical soul must not be divorced from religious participation. And is this not good—that there should be a wholeness in religion, that the intellect, too, should arrive at piety, as well as the will and the affections? If the intellect thinks materialism, while the heart loves God the Spirit, the mind will be like that house swept and garnished, which, however, is soon to be filled with the devils which scepticism brings along with it. There never was a greater mistake than that which supposes that religion may exist in the heart, while impiety of thought flourishes side by side. The Christian religion is a religion which carries with it a view of the world (the Germans call it a "*Welt-Anschauung*"), and it is impossible to separate this view of the world, or intellectual religion, from that feeling which the heart is to have, and which is to be the essential part of religion. For example, let us suppose a pious man who reads and believes Professor Bain's books on the brain as the producer of mind, and who comes to hold that there is no hereafter for the soul—that there is no soul, but only a function of brain and nerves. What can his heart say to itself in view of this conviction? Certainly nothing that can sound like Christianity. Or, suppose that one reads Feuerbach and Strauss, and comes to think that the entire Christian history is a myth—in short, that all religious histories base themselves upon natural phenomena, if not on "sun-myths," then on historical experiences. The Christian world is responsible for the perpetual readjustment of its theoretical view of the world so that there shall be no error without its refutation, no unworthy view of the soul without the true view grounded in its place. The intellect is not to be regarded, either, as a *bête noire*—as something which is unessential to religion, and which were better avoided altogether in religion if possible. Such a view would look upon theology as only a necessary evil, and would, in fact, imply a theory which made God not an intellect, not a God of truth, but only a God of goodness and love, only a blind goodness and love. This view forgets, when it thinks of piety in ancient times—of piety which said "*Credo ut intelligam*," or even "*credo quia impossibile*"—how that such piety took its view of the world from Christianity, and thought nature as perpetually the theatre of divine manifestation, and human history as immediate revelation of divine providence. If we in modern times have come to look upon nature as manifestation of Law, it is indispensable that we shall readjust our view of the world and learn to recognize the conscious personality of God in the world of laws, just as our fellow-Christians of the ninth century did recognize him in the immediate events of daily life.

In the ten chapters of this work Principal Caird treats first of the function of philosophy and the criticism of the organ of knowledge; next of the objections to the scientific treatment of religion, with especial reference to the theories of the unknowable and the relativity of knowledge; with further reference to the theory of immediate or intuitive knowledge *versus* logical or mediated knowing; and, further, with reference to the view which holds that revelation excludes the activity of reason. (The very acceptance of a revelation implies the activity of the intellect, and that the intellect be guided in its interpretation by consistent intellectual views. Without the highest exercise of the reason the revelation may be misunderstood—in fact, is certain to be misunderstood.) The necessity of religion is shown to be the necessity, which underlies the intellect, of tracing out “the steps of that process by which the finite spirit transcends its own finitude and rises into communion with the things unseen and eternal”—to show, in other words, how it is necessary to mind, to relate itself to God, and to determine that idea of God which its religious experience involves. He next discusses the proofs of the existence of God, and shows the real significance of the famous proofs that satisfied the intellect once, but are now not regarded with favor. In his sixth chapter he comes to treat of the nature of the religious consciousness, as containing feeling, and knowledge as well. He proceeds to show the defects of the representative or figurative form of knowledge—how it proves to be inadequate for grasping the unity of spiritual subjects and for solving their seeming contradictions. In Chapter VIII he examines the expedients of the discursive intellect for giving unity to knowledge, and shows the falsity of pantheism and anthropomorphism as theories of the relation of the human to the divine. He defines the province of morality, distinguishing it from religion, and closes his treatise with showing the relation of the transient to the permanent in religion—the contribution of history to religion, and the contribution of philosophy to it. We give the following quotations:

“Morality is, and from its nature can be, only the partial solution of the contradiction between the natural and the spiritual; and its partial or incomplete character may be said, in general, to arise from this, that while the end aimed at is the realization of an infinite ideal, the highest result of morality is only a never-ending approximation to that ideal. It gives us, instead of the infinite, only the negation of the finite.” “The spiritual life of man, as we have said, rests on the fact that reason or self-consciousness is the form of an infinite content, and has in it the never-ceasing impulse to make the actual life adequate to its ideal form.” “I am not one individual in a world of individuals, having a will of my own which is not theirs, as they have wills which are not mine, so that where my will ends their will begins; but, on the contrary, it is in ceasing to have a will of my own—to will only what pertains to my private, exclusive self, in entering into the life, identifying my will with the will and welfare of others—that I realize my own spiritual nature and become actually what, as possessed of a moral will, I am potentially. All truth is knowable as *my* knowledge, all good is willable as *my* will; and in the impossibility of being determined by anything foreign to my thought and will, of being negated by any thing or being in which I am not at the same time affirmed, lies the infinitude of man's spiritual nature.” “Religion rises above morality in this, that while the ideal of morality is only progressively realized, the ideal of religion is realized here and now. In that act which constitutes the beginning of the religious life—call it faith, or trust, or self-surrender, or by whatever name you will—there is involved the identification of the finite with a life which is eternally realized.” “For religion is the surrender of the finite will to the infinite, the abnegation of all desire, inclination, volition, that pertain to me as this private individual self, the giving up of

every aim or activity that points only to my exclusive pleasure or interest, the absolute identification of my will with the will of God. Oneness of mind and will with the divine mind and will is not the future hope and aim of religion, but its very beginning and birth in the soul."

THE REPUBLIC OF GOD: AN INSTITUTE OF THEOLOGY. By ELISHA MULFORD, LL. D. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. The Riverside Press, Cambridge. 1881.

Spinoza has left as his most important contribution to the history of philosophy a few technical expressions, such as *causa sui*, *infinitem actu*, *infinitem imaginationis*, *sub specie eternitatis*, and the like, some of which are borrowed from earlier writers—as Giordano Bruno, for example. The phrase "*sub specie eternitatis*" is not only descriptive of the form in which all universal and necessary ideas appear to us, but it paints for us the subjective state of mind in which such ideas are contemplated. The book of Dr. Mulford on Theology, named above, is one which may be said to be "*sub specie eternitatis*," in that it fixes its mind on the contemplation of God, and proceeds from the first page to the last without distracting itself by consideration of the standpoints of finite, discursive reasoning. It, therefore, appears to the latter standpoint as if it were wholly dogmatic, and even lacking in proper respect for the difficulties of conception which the latter finds in studying Christian theology. Notwithstanding this appearance, we must protest that this book contains more illumination of the dark and difficult points in theology than any other book of its epoch. It is one of the fruits of slow growth, from the mind of a man who ponders his subject for a decade, looking at its various phases from every conceivable standpoint, and looking quite through all the partial views before he begins to put his own thoughts into shape as a book. He has found a point of view whence the infinitely various attitudes of discursive reflection may all be seen at one glance, and harmonized by the larger synthesis which complements them, and thus refutes them as theories of the subject. Dr. Mulford's book on our national form of government, published many years since ("The Nation," 1870), is a book of the same style and method of composition, and of a like elevation in insight. It treats all partial views from the standpoint of the ideal nation, and is able to criticise the one-sidedness of imperfect theories from that view *sub specie eternitatis*.

Truth is not something that can be immediately received as soon as it is expressed in language. There is not such a thing as expressing profound philosophic or religious truth in language "so clear and simple" that the fool (*insipiens*) can understand it. It is true enough that he who runs may read—many things, doubtless, but of all that he reads he may not understand one jot or one tittle. The seeing of truth *sub specie eternitatis* requires the third stage of knowing. There is sense-perception, reflection, speculative knowing. The sense-perception knows things out of their relations; reflection knows them only in their relativity and dependence; the speculative knows them in the totality of their relations, and this alone is true knowing.

Dr. Mulford reviews, in his first chapter, the arguments for the being of God, and points out the defects of the reasoning as usually conducted. This is done, however, not in a negative manner, but in view of the true insight which sees that the being of God is a postulate of all knowing whatsoever. (See the article on "The Philosophy of Religion," in this number, in the Notes and Discussions.) For the first act of cognition is one that recognizes Being as the common predicate for both subject and object, and therefore recognizes Being as an Absolute category, valid to the extent of the reality of the absolute; for it transcends the mere subject which is opposed to an object, and likewise transcends the object as a mere alterum of consciousness. Hence the category

of Being postulates an Absolute which is neither me nor not-me in limited identity, but which is the identity of both as regards being the totality in which each participates, but which both do not constitute. "Man is conscious of the being of God, and lives and acts in this consciousness, and the reality of the being of God so comes to him." He dismisses Kant's refutation of Saint Anselm's ontological proof in a quiet way, with the remark that Kant assumes the difference between thought and being, a difference which holds only in case of finite things—"imperfect and incomplete things." The idea of God differs from the idea of things, inasmuch as it is the idea of that, than which there can be none greater, using the language of Anselm. God is totality, not a being over against some other. It is true that other beings exist, but only in so far as He gives them being and sustains them. There are thus two orders of Being—primitive and independent, and secondary or dependent. God alone belongs to the first, and his creation to the second. He gives to some a mere transient existence (*sub specie temporis*), and to others the form of spiritual beings with freedom and progressive realization of himself (*sub specie eternitatis*). "The idea and the being of God are one. In Him is the oneness of the ideal and the real." The ideal and real in God are one simply because of his totality. Any being whose ideal or potentiality is different from his reality cannot be an abiding form, but only a transient being which is in a state of change or development. But such a being would not be God, but would presuppose God as the ground of its possibility.

The style of Dr. Mulford is that of Aristotle, the review and criticism of the stand-points of reflection from the insight into the comprehension of the totality. The true itself is that which furnishes the only basis for criticism. Everywhere the book gives evidence that its author knows well the great affirmative results of German philosophy. Any one who possesses the thought of Aristotle can easily get at the secret of Hegel, but those who fail to see the Greek solution, and who miss the Christian idea, will not get more than pantheism from the German philosophy.

In his second chapter Dr. Mulford comes to the consideration of the nature of God. God is self-determined, and is therefore personal. The thought of God as *quo majus cogitari non potest*, or as the total, implies his self-determination. His determination can come from no other source, for there is no other source than the total, and He is therefore determined by himself, or else altogether undetermined. But an altogether undetermined God would be unconscious, and without attributes of any sort—a Brahman whose being is formless, so that he is neither good nor bad, holy nor wicked—an utter indifference to himself and to whatever else there may be. God is self-determined or else nothing. "The personality of God does not involve limitation; the only limitation is self-limitation—the limit which it sets in its own self-limitation." "Personality does not involve limitation. . . . Personality with God is the same as personality in man, . . . the personality of God, however, being infinite. Thought and will with him are one. God suffers the limitations of the finite that man may rise to the life that is infinite." "The personality of man has its foundation in the personality of God." Personality grounds also the relation of man to God, and is the condition of the communion of man with God. "The realization of personality brings man nearer to God. Through the deeper knowledge of himself, through self-knowledge, man comes to the knowledge of God." "The personality of God is also the foundation and the condition of the freedom of man. The self-determination of God in righteousness and freedom is the ground of the self-determination of man." Immortality, too, is conditioned on this personality of God. "The personality of God is the ground of the continuous being of the personality of man."

So, too, the divine attributes are involved in the fact of his personality. "God is person; the chiefest attribute of God is freedom; he is the self-determined one, his determination is the perfect manifestation of himself; this is the significance of the will of God; the holiness of God is the central principle in that will, the principle in which he cannot become other than himself; the righteousness of God is the assertion of that will on the earth; the love of God is the expression of a person toward those who are persons."

In chapter third Dr. Mulford discusses the precedent relations of religion and philosophy to the revelation of God. He quotes the definitions of religion given by Van Osterzee, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hagenbach, and others, and then proceeds to discriminate philosophy from religion: "The process of the one is in thought, of the other in worship; the one moves through reflection, the other through emotion; but each, in its development, involves the other, as it has for its aim the truth." Hegel had said: "The object in philosophy is upon the whole the same as in religion. In both, the object is truth, in that supreme sense in which God, and God only, is truth." He now comes to his great distinction: "The Revelation of and in Christ is not a religion, and it is not a philosophy." This paradox turns out to be the expression of a very important truth. He distinguishes religion from a revelation in the fact that religion means a ritual rather than a revelation. Maurice is quoted as saying: "In other books you have the records of a *religion*. You are told how a people introduced this worship and that ceremony; how their priests enforced new propitiations; how their soothsayers told them of services that they had neglected. Here you have nothing of the kind. All the religion which the priests of the people introduced—the worship on hills and in groves, the calves, the altars to a Baal—is noticed to be denounced: a righteous king proves his righteousness by sweeping it away." Both the Old Testament and the New reveal God, and do not set up a ritual merely. "Not here nor at Jerusalem; they that worship the father must worship him in spirit and in truth." "He that doeth the will shall know the doctrine." "Christ institutes no cultus of worship, and prescribes no system of dogma. There is no suggestion of form of worship or formula of doctrine. The blessing which he gives is of those who act and suffer in the life of humanity. It is of the gentle, of those who mourn, of those who suffer persecution for righteousness, of those who hunger after righteousness." "The difference between the revelation of the Christ and all religions is ultimate. But it consists with the fact that this revelation is manifested to and in humanity."

In succeeding chapters he speaks of The Revelation of God, of His Revelation in the Christ, of The Conviction of the World, of the Revelation of Heaven to the World, the World's Justification and Redemption, and The Life of the Spirit.

"This revelation is the revelation of God; it is *from* God, but primarily it is *of* God." So that God is no longer a far-off being, transcending consciousness and unknowable by man; He reveals his own being and will to man. "It says: 'Fear not; there is nothing hidden which shall not be known.'" "Its revelation is through the light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world."

This revelation comes as a person in Christ. "This revelation is not in a life that is external to God, or external to man."

"The consequence of wickedness is eternal punishment, and this is the assertion of an immutable principle. The punishment is eternal. But to identify this with an irrevocable doom is to set a finite limit to the divine redemption and to its perfect realization. It brings a section of the human race into an ultimate condition of fate, and

not of freedom. The spiritual law is eternal, but not the necessary continuance in sin of one child of earth and time."

"To the enquiry, 'Are there few that be saved?' the answer is: Strive to enter in at the strait gate. . . . It asserts that he that believeth shall be saved; and he that believeth not shall be condemned. . . . It does not assert in any moment, for any man, in the here or in the hereafter, an irrevocable doom. Its end is to save man from sin and from the doom involved in sin. It does not place any without hope; it makes hope a virtue, difficult as all virtue is in this world, but still one with faith and love; and if illusive, then also faith and love, for which the same ground and end is revealed, are illusive."

KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS: A COMPARISON OF CRITICAL AND EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY. By JOHN WATSON, M. A., LL. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in Queen's University, Kingston, Canada. Glasgow: James Maclehose, St. Vincent Street, Publisher to the University. 1881.

This being the centennial year of the publication of the Kantian Critique, we have many books relating to the famous critical system, as well as celebrations, in a more formal manner, of that great event in the history of modern philosophy. The study of Kant is being cultivated by the schools of thinkers who have close affinity to materialism, as well as by the spiritualistic thinkers. The physiological psychologists must needs try their skill at refuting the supposed demonstrations of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in order to disarm their opponents, the believers in the soul as a separate entity apart from the body. But all who are interested in moral philosophy are bound to study Kant as the founder of ethics on a stable foundation. The philosophy of ethics is the only positive result of the Kantian system.

This work by Professor Watson may be divided into three parts—which, however, are not formally separated from one another—viz.: a statement and defence of Kant's Theory of Knowledge, a criticism of English empirical philosophy, as represented by Spencer and Lewes, and an examination of Kant's own theory, conceived in the spirit of the Hegelian philosophy. The first chapter contains an exposition of the problem and method of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and also a defence of the critical or "transcendental" method against the animadversions of Mr. A. J. Balfour, whose *Defence of Philosophic Doubt* will be familiar to some of our readers. The problem of philosophy, according to Mr. Balfour, is to show "how much of what *pretends* to be knowledge we must accept as such, and why?" and the transcendental method consists in showing that we cannot admit the reality of the simplest perception without seeing that such principles as those of substance and causality are "involved" in them. To this view our author replies that Mr. Balfour has failed to see that Kant does not admit the superior validity of immediate perception, but, on the contrary, argues that a purely immediate perception is not a constituent in the intelligible world at all, and hence that to attempt any deduction of a philosophic principle from such a datum is absurd. The force of the critical argument is, therefore, altogether missed when it is supposed to lie in reasoning from immediate sensation to universal principles! Kant rather maintains that, as immediate sensation is not knowledge, but only an element in knowledge, intelligence must inform sensation before there can be any knowable world for us. In the second chapter the basis of mathematical truth, as expounded by Kant in the *Critique* and the *Prolegomena*, is stated, and it is contended, as against Mr. Henry Sidgwick, that Kant has only one method of refuting psychological idealism, his argument in both cases being that, on the supposition that knowledge is reducible

to a mere series of passing feelings, we should not have a knowledge even of the self as the subject of such feelings, since the self can only be known as an object in so far as we contrast with it a permanent world in space. Chapter III contains a full statement of the Deduction of the Categories and the Schematism of the Understanding, and points out what, in Kant's view, is the philosophical justification of the absoluteness of the laws of nature as embodied in the special sciences. In the next chapter Lewes's conception of Psychology is compared with that of Kant, and a full examination of the empirical origin of knowledge, as held by the former, is made. In contrast to Lewes's view, that sensation and consciousness are functions of the organism, it is pointed out that, unless by an abuse of terms, the organism cannot be regarded as the subject of knowledge, but only connotes physical and physiological properties. The "psychogeny" of Lewes is also held to rest upon a confusion between the transmission in a modified form of organic structure with the transmission of self-consciousness. The author then goes on to indicate Kant's reason for distinguishing between "mathematical" and "dynamical" principles, and contends, as against Dr. Stirling, that the principles of judgment are not subsequent to actual knowledge, but logically prior to it. The half unconscious evolution of those principles, as set forth by Kant, is pointed out, the progress being from the less to the more complex of them. Chapter VI contains a statement of the "proofs" of the principles of judgment, and a good deal of space is devoted to the accurate characterization of the proofs of substances and causality, about which there has been so much controversy of late. The next chapter is a further illustration of the same subject, and contains replies to the objections advanced to the proofs of Substance and Cause by Balfour and Stirling. Those objections are held to arise from an imperfect conception of the critical character of the proofs—*i. e.*, from not seeing the transformation in the ordinary dualism of intelligence and nature effected by Kant. The following chapter is devoted to Kant's metaphysic of nature, or categories of reflection, and contains the fullest statement of the contents of the *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* that has as yet appeared in English. In Chapter IX a comparison is drawn between the third chapter of Spencer's *First Principles* and the treatise analyzed in the preceding chapter. The method of Spencer is shown to be analytic or dogmatic, while the method of Kant is synthetic or critical. The comparison of Kant and Spencer is continued in the next chapter, in which the Noumenon of the one and the Unknowable of the other are shown to have only a superficial resemblance. Spencer's self-contradictory doctrine of the relativity of knowledge is carefully examined, and its source in his imperfect psychology is pointed out. The third part of the work, as contained in the last two chapters, consists of an examination of Kant's own theory of Knowledge. The provisional character of the contrast of the "manifold" as "given" and the "forms" as "originated," and of *a posteriori* and *a priori* Knowledge; the want of development in Kant's general theory; the absence of connection in the system of categories, and especially in those of Substance, Cause, and Reciprocity, and the untenability of the contrast of "pure" and "mixed" categories—forms the subject of the first of these chapters. The last chapter of all contains a very complete examination of the various elements of Knowledge distinguished by Kant, and endeavors to show in what points his doctrine, while right in principle, is burdened by "incoherent elements incompatible with its unity and completeness."

We think that Dr. Watson has done well in taking up Kant's metaphysic of nature and in discussing it in the light of the criticism from the standpoint of the physiolo-

gists. The views of Kant are in themselves of the greatest interest, but as related to the subjective idealists, as well as to the evolutionists, they are a sufficient fortress. The minute analysis of the fundamental concepts of nature and the physical world of matter and force, furnishes the best field on which to overthrow the theories of Materialism, and to discomfit mere idealism, so-called. The conception of matter as a synthesis of attractive and repulsive forces; the refutation of the atomists; the correct idea of quantity of matter, as correlative of quantity of motion; the three laws of Mechanics; the relativity of motion and what follows from this fact—all this relates vitally to the labors of the English school of evolutionists in so far as they have undertaken to treat of first principles. Dr. Watson has presented these things with great clearness, and, we think, opened a new and very important phase of the Kantian doctrine for discussion.

DIE PHILOSOPHIE DER GESCHICHTE. Von C. L. MICHELET. 2 Bände. Berlin, 1881.

This is the final work in Professor Michelet's extensive *System der Philosophie als exacter Wissenschaft*. The publication of the system was begun five years ago, and three volumes have appeared before the present, viz.: *Logik*, *Naturphilosophie*, and *Geistesphilosophie*. The first of the two volumes composing the Philosophy of History is devoted to the primeval world, the Orient and Greece; the second to Rome, Christian Europe, America, and the future. The brief introduction contains Professor Michelet's definition of his work, an interesting discussion of the literature of the subject, or, rather, of the conceptions of history held by the author's great predecessors in this field—Montesquieu, Lessing, Herder, Hegel, etc.—and an explanation of his principle of division. The absolute purpose or goal of history Professor Michelet pronounces the full realization of truth and freedom. In the working out of this he is greatly influenced by the conception most clearly stated by Schiller, that the object of man in history is the recovery by reason of what he possessed unconsciously as instinct in his primitive condition, and from which he fell. The process is from a state of nature, an Eden, through a period of struggle, the present to a future golden age, in which the moral conflict shall be ended and the race shall rest in the enjoyment of perfect social relations. This process is pronounced to be in accordance with a certain geographical principle—and it is in the elaboration of this that most readers will think Professor Michelet fanciful, true as the general principle seems to be that "Westward the course of empire takes its way." According to him, Japan must have been the cradle of the race, and Australia is to be the utopia towards which "Sanct-Humanus" is irresistibly pressing. This will certainly stir up the local pride of the good people of Melbourne and Sydney. Meantime we Americans can take genuine satisfaction in the high place which Professor Michelet assigns us for the present and the immediate future. We have certainly seen no work emanating from Germany in which the significance of America has been more fully recognized and more intelligently discussed. America is the land of the present, and here the principle of political freedom seems to Professor Michelet to have been first realized in institutions. "America has attained full political majority, which is true of no European nation. In Europe it is still heroes and statesmen who rise, push to the front, and draw to themselves the majority of the people. In America the majority controls the statesman. The statesman is not the controller, but the servant of public opinion, as President Lincoln expressly declared of himself. 'A European village,' says Philarète Chasles, 'cannot govern itself; there is the priest, the land-owner; there are the heads of the old historical parties, Royal-

ists, Republicans, Bonapartists, who manage everything!' Under the American self-government, on the other hand, nothing is expected of the state, but everything from the people's own initiative. This is the true democracy." Professor Michelet discusses the social and family life of America—education, the relation of church and state, and the leading principles of our constitution—everywhere with clear insight and hearty sympathy, touching with enthusiasm upon the general educating influence of our polity, and putting in some words of defence for us against some common charges, such, for instance, as that of our absorbing devotion to money-making. Europe, he says, can scarcely claim to be free from the passion; and this is certainly true of the rich man in America, that, far more generally than in Europe, he is not an idler, but employs his money in active enterprises which promote the common weal. Indeed, Professor Michelet's praises of us altogether are so unstinted that in self-satisfied enjoyment of them we have, perhaps, been seduced into dwelling upon them to the neglect of more important features of his work. Yet, on the whole, we do not think that there is anything more important in it than its clear recognition of America's political significance; and those who may be prompted to read it for this will find what of importance there is besides.

E. D. MEAD.

BOSTON, MASS.

FAITH AND FREEDOM. By STOPFORD BROOKE. Edited, with an Introduction upon Mr. Brooke's Life and Works, and the significance of his New Movement, by Edwin D. Mead. Boston: Geo. H. Ellis, 1881.

Stopford Brooke's "Life of Robertson of Brighton," and his volumes upon "Christ in Modern Life," and "Theology in the English Poets," have already secured for him a large circle of readers in America, and recognition everywhere as one of the finest religious thinkers of our time. The editor of the present volume pronounces him the greatest preacher that the Church of England has had since Robertson of Brighton; and this high praise does not seem too high. It has not been in the pulpit that Stanley has exerted his greatest influence, and perhaps it was not there that Maurice was most powerful. This new volume, selected chiefly from Brooke's later works, has been prepared for the special purpose of illustrating his theology, and the general character of his religious thought, which have now become matters of such peculiar interest by reason of his separation from the Church of England. An appendix contains the much-discussed Letter to the Congregation of Bedford Chapel, in which Mr. Brooke announced his withdrawal from the Church, and the sermon, "Salt without Savor," in which he more fully stated his reasons for the step. The casual reader will naturally turn first to these, and the latter, with its lofty conception of the doctrine of the Incarnation, and its stirring plea for sincerity, liberty, and the democratic idea, is certainly most interesting. But the real value of the book lies in such sermons as the second, entitled, "God is Spirit," that upon "The Light of God in Man," the two upon "The Fitness of Christianity for Mankind," and the series upon "Immortality." These last are very great sermons. Their discussions of Comtism and Secularism, of the dangers of an absorption in secondary causes, and of those peculiar conditions of our present intellectual and social life which have so weakened the belief in immortality in so many, ought to have a wide reading. Mr. Brooke is very much of a Fichtean in philosophy, and owns his obligation for very much in his argument for immortality from the consciousness of the moral law to the *Vocation of Man*. Mr. Mead's Introduction is excellent.

E.